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CASE NOTES
cases, reveals compelling reasons, justifying the action of the court. Public
welfare must be put before private liberties. This is not to say that a
small danger to public welfare will justify an irreparable blow to an in-
dividual's liberties, but some balance must be struck. Each case must be
weighed individually. If in the instant case, there had been two methods
of treatment available, or if the operation required had not been a simple
transfusion, but a more difficult operation which itself constituted a threat
to the child's life, perhaps the case would be decided differently. How-
ever, in the present case a simple and safe operation was all that was
required to save the child from imminent death. It cannot be legally,
logically, or morally argued that the action taken was incorrect. 22
Joseph F. Doyle
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL INSANITY-PSYCHOLOGIST'S DIAGNOSIS RE-
GARDING MENTAL DISEASE OR DEFECT ADMISSIBLE ON
ISSUE OF INSANITY.
Jenkins v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1962).
Appellant was indicted for housebreaking with intent to commit an
assault; he pleaded insanity as his defense. Two examining psychiatrists
at District General Hospital reported that appellant was "suffering from
an organic brain defect resulting in mental deficiency and impaired judg-
ment."' Thereupon, the district court adjudged appellant incompetent to
stand trial and committed him to St. Elizabeth's Hospital pursuant to a
local statute.2 There, appellant underwent an extensive battery of tests
and was personally examined by a number of staff psychologists, two of
whom concluded that at the time of the alleged crime appellant was
suffering from schizophrenia. Some months later, a hearing was ordered to
reconsider appellant's competency to stand trial. The two psychiatrists who
had originally examined appellant requested Dr. Bernard I. Levy, Chief
Psychologist at District General Hospital, to re-test the appellant. After
reviewing all of the data, Dr. Levy, previously unable to make a diagnosis,
concluded appellant was "psychotic and schizophrenic."'3 Considering these
reports and those of St. Elizabeth's, the psychiatrists revised their
former diagnoses, one concluding that appellant was schizophrenic and
the other that he was suffering from undifferentiated psychosis. The trial
22. The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari, 31 U.S.L. WE8K
3152 (U.S. Nov. 6, 1962).
1. 307 F.2d 637 at 639 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
2. D.C. Code Ann. tit. 24 § 301 (1951), as amended 1955.
3. 307 F.2d 637 at 640 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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court excluded the psychiatrists' revised diagnoses and instructed the
jury to disregard the testimony of the three defense psychologists on the
ground that a "psychologist is not competent to give a medical opinion as
to a mental disease or defect."'4 The circuit court of appeals, with four
judges concurring in two separate opinions and two dissenting, reversed,
holding that a psychologist's diagnosis of mental disease is admissible in
a criminal proceeding. Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C.
Cir. 1962).
Before the support of the expert witness can be enlisted two elements
are required: the subject of the inference to be drawn must be so dis-
tinctively related to some science, profession or occupation as to be beyond
the ken of the average layman, and the witness must possess such
skill, knowledge or experience in that field as to make it probable that
his opinion will aid the trier in his search.5 Applying these standards,
it would initially appear that a psychologist holding one or more graduate
degrees and having devoted all of his professional efforts to one or more
areas of mental disorders would qualify as an expert on insanity. Never-
theless, there has been considerable judicial reluctance to receive the testi-
mony of a psychologist on the issue of mental competency 6 although it
has been received on other matters.7 The source of the difficulty has been
the identification of "insanity" with "mental disease," thus bringing it
within the realm of medical science - the study and treatment of disease.8
The effect is virtually to restrict expert testimony on insanity to the
psychiatrist and the physician.9 The resulting overemphasis on the im-
portance of a medical degree to the exclusion of the testimony of the
4. Id. at 643.
5. MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE § 13 (1954).
6. Dobbs v. State, 191 Ark. 236, 85 S.W.2d 694 (1935) (dictum), (psychologist
not qualified to testify in murder trial when defense was insanity) ; People v. Spigno,
156 Cal. App. 2d 279, 319 P.2d 458 (1957) (in a prosecution for commission of lewd act
upon a child psychologist's testimony that the defendant lacked necessary lustful intent
was held inadmissible). See also, State v. Gibson, 15 N.J. 384, 105 A.2d 1 (1954),
overruled on other grounds sub non., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d
497 (1960); Abbott v. State, 113 Neb. 517, 204 N.W. 74 (1925), rev'd on other
grounds, 113 Neb. 517, 206 N.W. 153 (1925).
7. It should be noted that the psychologist is not a newcomer to the field of
qualified experts. The importance of his tests and resulting interpretations has
been judicially recognized in areas other than the diagnosis of mental disease or
defect. E.g., Stemmer v. Kline, 128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A.2d 489 (1942) (particularly
concurring opinion), permitting a psychologist to render his expert opinion as to
whether X-ray given mother during pregnancy resulted in child being micro-
cephalic idiot; In Re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944), psychologist
permitted to testify on feeble-mindedness of petitioner where this condition was
determined by I.Q. tests administered and interpreted by the witness; People v.
Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.E.2d 609 (1944), clinical psychologist testified de-
fendant was "narcissistic" on the basis of psychometric test administered by him
where defendant's sanity in a criminal case was in issue.
8. However, this view is rarely stated in psychiatry today. See Scheflen, The
Psychologist as a Witness, 32 PA. B.A.Q. 329 (1961).
9. "The psychologist is not necessarily a physician but, instead, probably holds
a Ph.D. degree. He has done four years of undergraduate work in psychology, plus
probably another four years of graduate study, followed by the service of an
internship." Gaines, The Clinical Psychologist as an Expert Witness in a Personal
Injury Case, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 239 (1956).
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highly trained and skilled non-medic ignores the educational and practical
qualifications of the psychologist. Such a rule forces the courts into the
anomalous position of qualifying as an expert the general practitioner who
has had no special training in mental disease 10 while rejecting the skilled
psychologist."
There has been a small but significant trend to cases indicating an
adjustment of the old rule to reflect more accurately the achievements
and abilities of the psychologist. One of the earliest cases to express dis-
approval of the exclusion of a qualified psychologist was People v. Haw-
thorne.12 Judge Butzel, in a concurring opinion in which he was joined by
four other members of the court, declared that merely the inclusion of insanity
within the realm of medical science did not of itself pre-empt from the
field of qualified experts anyone not holding a medical degree. In dis-
cussing the trial court's rejection of a learned psychologist as a witness 13
on the issue of the defendant's sanity, he stated that the law does not
require a rule so formal and that the cause of justice is not furthered by
insisting that only a medical man may competently advise on the subject
of mental condition. However, the trial court was cautioned to investigate
the qualifications of such an "expert" with greater care than would be
necessary in the case of a medical school graduate. Judge Butzel's pru-
dent counsels were given practical effect several years later in Hidden v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co.14 Plaintiff brought a civil action based on the
permanent disability clause of two life insurance policies; he claimed he had
been afflicted with a disabling nervous condition which had forced his
retirement. Two physicians, skilled in psychiatry and neurology, and a
psychologist, were offered as experts. The latter's testimony was excluded
on the ground that a psychologist was not qualified to testify on such
matters. In addition to his impressive credentials,' the psychologist was the
only one of the witnesses who had examined the insured at the time of his
original disability application. On appeal, the circuit court held that the
psychologist qualified as an expert by reason of his academic training and
experience; further, it was pointed out that one of the psychiatrists had
based his opinion on the objective tests administered by the psychologist.
10. Holland v. State, 80 Tex. Crim. 637, 192 S.W. 1070 (1917); Crocker v.
Crocker, 156 Ark. 309, 246 S.W. 6 (1922); Baldridge v. Zigler, 103 Okla. 219, 229
Pac. 831 (1924) (semble); Commonwealth v. Cavalier, 284 Pa. 311, 131 Atl. 229
(1925).
11. Supra note 6.
12. 293 Mich. 15, 291 N.W. 205 (1940).
13. The proposed witness's qualifications included: attendance at Wesleyan
University, Yale University and the Harvard Foundation; he held the degrees of Bache-
lor of Arts, Master of Arts, Bachelor of Divinity and Doctor of Philosophy in Psychol-
ogy ; as a graduate student he attended the University of California, Columbia University,
Boston University, Harvard University Medical School and the Boston Psycho-
pathic Hospital; he was a full professor at two colleges and two universities and
had given courses in normal and abnormal, experimental, educational psychology and
criminology; insanity and diseases of the brain were his special study.
14. 217 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1954).
15. The witness held a Ph.D. in clinical psychology, had had experience in army
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In Watson v. State," a Texas court gave additional vitality to the
Hawthorne dictum in applying it in a criminal proceeding. A psychologist"
was asked to answer a hypothetical question based on a condensation of
the 128 page testimony of the defendant in which she recounted her life's
history. It was held that the lower court's exclusion of the psychologist
deprived the defendant of admissible evidence. The court noted that, al-
though medical men, preferably psychiatrists, had traditionally been called
upon to testify regarding the question of insanity, a practicing psycholo-
gist, with considerable training and experience in analyzing motivation,
was qualified to give testimony superior to a layman's and should be
classified as an expert. Although the Hidden and Watson cases do not
deal with the precise problem posed by the instant case, namely a full
pre-trial diagnosis of a mental disease or defect after an extended period
of observation and testing, they do crystallize the Hawthorne directive
into a workable body of precedent. In so doing they provide the necessary
intermediate step that precedes most significant advances in judicial think-
ing.1
It is not without significance that the present decision accords skills
to the clinical psychologist in the courtroom which are not ordinarily
recognized as within his competence in a hospital. Traditionally, hospitals
have not considered the diagnosis of a psychologist as qualified. However,
there is an important distinction to be drawn between the hospital and the
courtroom diagnosis. In the former setting a diagnosis is made the basis
of the patient's treatment and subsequent rehabilitation. Since the afflicted
patient's condition may be founded on an organic disorder or some compli-
cation resulting therefrom, and since the psychologist would probably lack
the necessary background to isolate the precise cause of such a deviation,
he would be unable to prescribe the proper treatment. The courtroom
diagnosis, on the other hand, does not insist on these precise determinations.
The test of insanity as propounded in the Durham case' requires the
16. 161 Tex. Crim. 5, 273 S.W.2d 879 (1954).
17. Here the witness had trained in psychology for five years at Harvard and
two years at the University of Texas before engaging in psychological counseling in
a penal institution for ten years.
18. The court in Jenkins also supported its decision with a line of cases which
permitted persons lacking medical training to testify as to the effects of certain
foreign substances or reactions on the body. Vessels v. Kansas City Eight & Power
Co., 219 S.W. 80 (Mo. 1920) and Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394,133
So. 16 (1931), witnesses who have had experience in electrical work may testify to
the effects of electrical shock upon the human body; Jackson v. Waller, 126 Conn.
294, 10 A.2d 763 (1940), optometrist may testify to the presence of cataract dis-
covered in fitting of glasses; Black Starr Coal Corp. v. Reeder, 278 Ky. 532, 128
S.W.2d 905 (1939), optometrist may testify to the effect of scar upon vision;
Reynolds v. Davis, 55 R.I. 206, 179 At. 613 (1935), toxicologist permitted to
testify to the effect of oxalic acid, a poison, upon the human eye. An attempt was
made by the court to analogize these non-medical witnesses with the psychologist,
the implication being that to qualify as an expert with respect to the human body
one need not be a physician. The analogy is defective for it must be remembered that
the issue is not whether a psychologist may give some expert testimony on the
question of insanity but whether he may render a diagnosis of a mental disease or
defect - a task which heretofore required a medical opinion.
19. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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expert to answer only whether the defendant was suffering from a mental
disease or defect and, if so, whether the criminal act was a product of such
abnormality.20 The first question solicits an opinion based on the psycholo-
gist's test analysis, interpretation, personal observations and whatever other
factors his training and experience indicate may be relevant. This same
training and experience should similarly qualify him to express an
opinion on the causal nexus between the act and the disorder. Thus, the
Durham rule, by eliminating the factors which are of such crucial im-
portance in the hospital diagnosis, serves to qualify the psychologist as
an expert in the courtroom. It may be argued that if a mental disease or
defect is discovered, it must be properly identified before the question of
causality can be adequately considered. It must be recognized that the
clinical psychologist is certainly competent to identify non-organic de-
viations; it is suggested that regarding organic disorders, the expert's
general designation of the malfunction as such should suffice without
further categorization. If, however, the present decision is followed in a
jurisdiction employing the M'Naghten test,21 a more serious question arises
as to whether a psychologist should be on an equal footing with the
physician or psychiatrist. At least one authority suggests that this exceeds
the competence of the psychologist who is expected to state his opinion
only "concerning the mental states, the diagnosis, the personality and
intellectual organization of the defendant based on the information de-
rived from the psychological tests and any other sources." '22
The majority in Jenkins appears to follow what has been characterized
the "modern common sense" approach to expert testimony.23 The deter-
minative test is "whether the opinion offered will be likely to aid the trier
in the search for truth." While it would seem that the expertise of the
highly trained and experienced psychologist complies with this simple
formula, the mandate is not without problems in its practical application by
the trial judge. As to whether a particular psychologist qualifies as an
expert, the court reposes the initial determination in the traditional dis-
cretion of the trial court subject to appellate ,review. Regarding what cre-
dentials a psychologist must present to a trial judge, a variety of possibilities
present themselves. Licensing statutes may be of assistance in some
jurisdictions, 24 although several states have not adopted such legislation, 25
20. Id. at 875.
21. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). The test of
criminal insanity under this case turned on the inability of the defendant to know
the nature or moral quality of his act.
22. McDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 171 (1958).
23. Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 MINN. L. Rv. 235,
243, discussing the approach used in Bratt v. Western Air Lines, 155 F.2d 850 (10th
Cir. 1946).
24. Note, 33 CHT.-KENT L. Rnv. 230 (1955), in which the author, who holds a
Ph.D. degree in psychology and is the Director of the Clinical Training Program at
the University of Houston, approves of licensing statutes as a criterion.
25. There are no such statutes in Pennsylvania, New Mexico or the District of
Columbia. Biut see, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-188-91 (1960); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 43, §§ 618-20, 629-36 (1957) ; Micit. REv. STAT. ANN. vol. 10, § 14.677 (Supp.
1961) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. vol. 11, § 148.81 (Supp. 1962).
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and, where adopted, the requirements have not been uniform. 26 At the
other extreme, it has been suggested that the proposed witness hold the
diploma of the American Board of Examiners in Professional Psychology.
2 7
One court settled on what might be termed a compromise between these
two standards.2 8 While approving generally the proposition that a psycholo-
gist is competent to testify on the issue of insanity it rejected the opinion
of a psychologist who did not possess a Ph.D. degree, who lacked post-
graduate training in clinical psychology, and who had not done one year's
internship at a mental hospital approved by the American Psychological
Association. 29 At the same time, the court indicated that certain psycholo-
gists who had wide practical experience, but who did not fulfill the
aforementioned requirements, might also qualify. The majority in Jenkins
stated that a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology might suffice. The problem,
however, is still a difficult one for the trial judge since the attainment
of such a degree does not inform him of the particular witness's experience
in diagnosing mental disease or in determining criminal responsibility
under the Durham rule. This type of uncertainty might well engender a
prolonged preliminary qualifying hearing, perhaps conducted in adver-
sarv fashion, in which each proposed witness would be questioned re-
garding his degrees, experience, coursework and learning. To avoid such
a dilatory scheme, some objective criterion and direction should be found.3 0
Whatever criterion is ultimately adopted, it seems evident that the present
court's holding, without further qualification, should create a greater
number of "expert" witnesses who will be available to the criminally ac-
cused (and, perhaps, financially embarrassed) defendant, to assist him in his
insanity plea. 3'
C. Clark lodgson, Jr.
26. Compare Minnesota statute requiring as the minimum education require-
ment for licensing a master's degree with Michigan requiring a doctoral degree or its
equivalent.
27. This requires applicant to have four years professional post-doctoral ex-
perience, present credentials, which include a sample of his work, and letters of
recommendation, plus complete oral and written examinations. Kelley, Sanford &
Clark, The Meaning of the ABEPP Diploma, 16 AM. PSvCHOL. 132 (1961).
28. State v. Padilla, 66 N.M. 289, 347 P.2d 312 (1959).
29. These qualifications were selected by the court from McDONALD, supra
note 19 at 162; Medical Trial Technique Quarterly, 1957 Annual 9-18.
30. Burger, J., in his concurring opinion indicated that a rigorous exploratory
hearing should be conducted on remand to determine, inter alia, the scope, nature
and extent of the education of a Ph.D. in Psychology and in Clinical Psychology, the
clinical psychologist's clinical education in physiological and medical subjects, par-
ticularly in comparison with that of a psychiatrist, the independent diagnostic prac-
tices of the clinical psychologist and the correlation between mental disease and
biological, physical or physiological data.
31. One further problem suggests itself in the trial of cases under this rule.
It might be rhetorically asked what significance will the jury attach to the defense
psychologist's testimony when confronted with the conflicting testimony of the
state's psychiatrist? Will recitation to the jury of the psychiatrist's qualifications,
which will include a medical degree, have any prejudicial effect on the defendant
who produces a psychologist?
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